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FOREWORD
It is a well established axiom that attempting to
defeat an insurgency or a terrorist organization headon is merely treating the symptoms of a problem. For
long-term success, the campaign must also address
the root causes of the insecurity that spawned conflict
in the first place.
In this monograph, British academic and practitioner Dr. Shima Keene describes a number of ways in
which financial intelligence can be leveraged not only
to disrupt adversary activities, but also to provide
indicators and warnings of future actions and, ultimately, to address underlying insecurities. Dr. Keene
was previously both a banker and a British Army reservist. In this monograph, she uses her expertise as a
threat finance specialist to outline specific areas where
financial intelligence analysis techniques, which
are common in the private sector, can be applied to
combating insurgency, terrorism, and other hard
security threats.
Dr. Keene argues that financial disruption techniques used in counterinsurgency have been poorly
coordinated and at times counterproductive, and cites
the targeting of the Hawala money transfer system
as a specific example. Instead, she notes intelligence
derived from analysis of financial data can provide
much greater value in both understanding and predicting the adversary’s activities, as well as providing
for precise targeting to disrupt them.
The Strategic Studies Institute recommends this
monograph not only to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism practitioners and policymakers, but also
to the Intelligence community more widely; all of these
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will find its conclusions on the handling of financial
data and the value of threat finance analysis valuable.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
U.S. military leaders, planners, and decisionmakers face a new security environment in the 21st century, characterized by its complex networked nature,
which has emerged as a result of globalization accompanied by the ever increasing speed of technological
advancements. This in turn has created a new set of
security dynamics that is increasingly spawning a variety of asymmetric threats, changing the very nature
of conflict. The result is a complex and untidy security
environment, where even attempting to define the
nature of the threat has become difficult. Historically,
adversaries were well-defined, allowing a relatively
clear course of action to be chosen against them. This is
no longer the case, as nonstate actors forming a global
network of terrorist organizations, associated criminal groups, corrupt governments, and indifferent or
uninformed individuals or corporations, increasingly
take center stage. The state now faces an enemy whose
asymmetry is such that concepts such as “civilian” and
“military” or even “legality” have become obsolete.
The consequence is that the traditional approach of
attempting to find a solution for a particular security
problem has become ineffective. In fact, it is no longer
appropriate to look for a single solution as such. In the
new networked world, most problems are multidimensional in nature making them difficult or impossible to solve due to their incomplete, contradictory,
and constantly evolving nature. These are generally
referred to as “wicked” problems, characterized by
their complex interdependencies where action taken
to address one aspect of the problem may reveal or
create additional problems.
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As such, it is essential that a problem is examined
not as a stand-alone subject, but in the context of the
existing interdependencies so as to be better able to
appreciate the possible knock-on effects of actions
which may be taken. Furthermore, these challenges
can no longer be tackled by any single organization or
country. The hybrid nature of problems and conflict
itself, coupled with resource limitations, will require
partners to work more closely together than ever before. This multi-stakeholder environment in itself can
be challenging due to the existence of differing cultures, both organizational and geographical, as well as
differing perspectives and motives, despite the united
goal of the partnership as a whole.
The reality of this threat environment is that it has
changed the nature of warfare itself, with significant
implications for the U.S. Army. In recent years, the
role of the military has evolved from pure “warfighting” to more non-warfighting missions such as peace
keeping and preventive engagements. These additional requirements demand that military personnel
become more aware of the broader security picture,
as well as that they develop additional skills that will
allow them not only to be good soldiers, but to have
the flexibility and adaptability to play a number of additional roles to include peacekeeper, humanitarian
agent, law enforcement official, and diplomat, as the
situation demands.
As such, it is important not only to know what the
immediate problem is, but to understand the wider
surrounding issues, as well as the underlying causes
of that problem. Actions taken without an understanding of the full dynamics of the threat can backfire, and
numerous examples are available from the last decade
of counterinsurgency operations. Uninformed actions,

x

however well-intentioned, will have negative side effects, and consequences potentially of sufficient magnitude to endanger the overall military mission.
This must be avoided at all costs. This monograph
therefore provides recommendations for addressing a
specific area where the capability of the United States
and allied militaries can be augmented for the purpose
of targeted action against adversaries: that of threat
finance, and effective counter threat finance strategies.
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OPERATIONALIZING COUNTER
THREAT FINANCE STRATEGIES
INTRODUCTION—THE CHALLENGES
U.S. military leaders, planners, and decisionmakers face a new security environment in the 21st century, characterized by its complex networked nature,
which has emerged as a result of globalization accompanied by the ever increasing speed of technological
advancements. This in turn has created a new set of
security dynamics that is increasingly spawning a variety of asymmetric threats, changing the very nature
of conflict.
The result is a complex and untidy security environment, where even attempting to define the nature
of the threat has become difficult. Historically, adversaries were well-defined, allowing a relatively clear
course of action to be chosen against them. This is no
longer the case, as nonstate actors forming a global
network of terrorist organizations, associated criminal groups, corrupt governments, and indifferent or
uninformed individuals or corporations, increasingly
take center stage. The state now faces an enemy whose
asymmetry is such that concepts such as civilian and
military or even legality have become obsolete.1
The consequence is that the traditional approach
of attempting to find a solution for a particular security problem has become ineffective. In fact, it is no
longer appropriate to look for a single solution as
such. This is because in the new networked world,
most problems are multidimensional in nature. This
makes the problems difficult or impossible to solve
due to their incomplete, contradictory, and constantly
evolving nature.2 These are generally referred to as
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“wicked” problems which are characterized by their
complex interdependencies, where action taken to address one aspect of the problem may reveal or create
additional problems.
As such, it is essential that the problem is examined not as a stand-alone subject, but in the context
of the existing interdependencies in order to be able
to appreciate better the possible knock-on effects of
actions which may be taken. Furthermore, these challenges can no longer be tackled by any single organization or country. The hybrid nature of problems and
conflict itself coupled with resource limitations will
require partners to work more closely together than
ever before. This multistakeholder environment in itself can be challenging due to the existence of differing cultures, both organizational and geographical, as
well as differing perspectives and motives, despite the
united goal of the partnership as a whole.
The reality of this threat environment is that it has
changed the nature of warfare itself, with significant
implications for the U.S. Army. In recent years, the
role of the military has evolved from pure warfighting
to more non-warfighting missions such as peacekeeping and preventive engagements. These additional
requirements require military personnel to become
more aware of the broader security picture, as well as
to develop additional skills that will allow them not
only to be good soldiers, but to have the flexibility and
adaptability to play a number of additional roles to include peacekeeper, humanitarian agent, law enforcement official, and diplomat, as the situation demands.
As such, it is important not only to know what the
immediate problem is, but to understand the wider
surrounding issues, as well as the underlying causes
of that problem. Action taken without an understand-
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ing of the full dynamics of the threat can backfire, and
numerous examples are available from the last decade
of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Uninformed
actions, however well-intentioned, will have negative
side effects, and consequences potentially of sufficient
magnitude to endanger the overall military mission.
This must be avoided at all costs. This monograph
therefore provides recommendations for addressing
a specific area where the capability of U.S. and allied
militaries can be augmented for the purpose of targeted action against adversaries: that of threat finance,
and effective counter threat finance strategies.
THE ROOT CAUSES OF INSECURITY
AND CONFLICT
In order to provide context for these recommendations, we need to consider the unstable and conflict-prone environments in which they could be employed. Many of the factors that cause insecurity and
conflict, such as terrorism and insurgencies, are not
new. Insurgencies of the kind witnessed in the early
21st century have forerunners in many parts of the
world throughout human history. Early examples of
the potentially catastrophic effects of insurgency are
the invasion of the Akkadian empire in Mesopotamia
in the 22nd century BC by the Gutians (“barbarian
people”) from the Zagros Mountains, which resulted
in the eventual collapse of the empire; and insurgency
operations conducted by a variety of barbarians such
as the Huns,3 which contributed to the fall of the Roman empire in the 5th century AD.4 Other examples
include the Peninsular War (1807-14), for the control
of the Iberian Peninsula, which led to the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, and the Greek war for independence
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against the Ottomans in the 19th century (1821-32).
Importantly, some of the key drivers of insurgencies
remain unchanged over time and therefore can be
used as indicators and warnings of future instability.
Similarly, terrorism has served as one of the most
common expressions of man’s inhumanity to man
since time immemorial. Although definitions remain
controversial, the term “terrorism” is generally used
to refer to the killing of innocent people5 with most
accepting the United Nations (UN) description as:
. . . any act intended to cause death or serious bodily
harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose
of intimidating or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing
any act.6

Early examples of terrorism include the terror attacks by the Cimbri tribe in 105 BC which led Rome
to declare a state of emergency known as terror cimbricus7, or the use of the word by Jacobins imposing
a reign of terror during the French Revolution in the
18th century. However, it was the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) that brought terrorism to the top
of the political agenda for the United States and its
allies. The events of 9/11 served as a turning point for
terrorism, highlighting its metamorphosis into a new
age of international terrorism, marked by different
motivations, actors, and sponsors. In addition, greater
ambitions and lethality were highlighted, no longer
confined by geographical boundaries, representing an
upward shift to a new level of global threat previously
unseen and unknown. As such, not only will the need
for effective counterterrorism and COIN doctrine continue into the foreseeable future, but counter efforts
will need to be more sophisticated than ever before to
tackle this new form of adversary at all levels.
4

However, attempting to defeat an insurgency or a
terrorist organization head-on is merely treating the
symptoms of a problem. For long-term success, the
military campaign must also address the root causes of
that insecurity. In order to achieve this, a move away
from a pure focus on tactical COIN and counterterrorism operations is essential. Instead, a comprehensive
approach that combines economic, governance, and
security measures should be adopted, where the understanding of threat finance should play a key part.
This can be better achieved when the reasons of insecurity and conflict are fully understood. Numerous
factors contribute to instability, insecurity, and conflict, ranging from the disruptive influences of adversary organizations, such as terrorist networks and organized crime groups (OCGs), to political unrest and
social revolution. Some of the key contributors are
as follows.
Bad Governance.
Bad governance is a major cause of instability and
conflict. Inadequate governments rife with incompetence, coupled with the lack of an effective judicial
system, promote a culture that lacks transparency
and accountability. This in turn creates an environment where corruption and criminality can prosper.
Money and power are key motivations. In addition,
social pressures, especially those created by rapid increases in population density, can lead to instabilities
of governance. This results in general insecurity and
instability as even established governments are overtaken by rapid and drastic change as they fail to cope
with explosive social pressures, causing breakdown of
social stability and increased mobility. The result is a
failed state.8
5

Failed and Failing States.
Failed states are one of the dominant and defining features of conflict. States that cannot adapt to the
changing global context risk collapse, and many such
failures will be accompanied by substantial outbreaks
of violence. Furthermore, poor governance, economic
deprivation, and inequality that characterize failed
and failing states are likely to spread to neighboring states in the form of economic migration as well
as crime.9
Economic Resources.
Competition over primary resources such as energy, food, minerals, and water has played a key role
in conflict throughout human history. Economic resources will continue to drive states’ security interests in terms of both control of those resources and
methods of their distribution.10 In addition, these considerations are likely to dictate why we fight, where
we fight, as well as how we fight. This competition
also engenders a sense of injustice which may lead to
eventual confrontation.
Inequality.
The injustices felt as a result of uneven distribution of wealth will contribute to conflict. This wealth
gap sets the rich against the poor, both within countries (especially in developing countries) and between
countries, making some national borders especially
sensitive. The degree of sensitivity and potential
problems can be expressed in the ratio of wealth dif-
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ferential. For example, the ratio between the United
States and Mexico is 6:1. In other words, each U.S.
citizen is on average six times wealthier than each
Mexican. Similarly, the wealth ratio for Spain and
Algeria is 14:1.11 This disparity results in economic
migrants entering the European Union (EU), causing
further friction.
Inability to Manage Change.
One of the biggest causes of drastic instability is the
failure of societies to handle change. Excessive conservatism and resistance to change, especially when this
is forced upon a population, causes tensions to build
within society, just as seismic tension does in California’s San Andreas Fault. If the accumulated tensions
are released suddenly, the result can be catastrophic.
Information Ubiquity.
As a result of the internet and the availability and
affordability of technologies such as mobile phones or
personal computers, populations are able to access a
wide range of information quickly. Such ubiquity of
information is essential to sustain the vast urbanized
populations, but it also brings with it new forms of
power that we must understand in order to be able
to exploit and to counter them, as well as to integrate
them with other forms of power. Failure to do so will
result in instabilities and loss of influence and power
for governments and established political structures.
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Extremist Nonstate Actors.
International terrorist organizations such as alQaeda and its associates are likely to remain a significant threat to the United States and its allies. In its
globalized franchised form, these actors create partnerships with local militants and organized criminality. Together, they take advantage of any emerging
instability which they will exploit as a weapon against
the West.
Ideology, Culture, and Religion.
Ideological movements, based on religion and
identity, will remain a significant factor as people continue to fight for their beliefs. Irreconcilable cultural
and religious differences, between and within communities, local, regional, virtual (cyber) and international will continue to be a destabilizing factor. Furthermore, the spread of ideology has no geographic
constraints due to advancements in communications
technologies.
Conclusion.
Any one of these factors can cause conflict. However, the more factors present, the more likely it is
that conflict will emerge, and the more complex and
intractable will be any resulting problems. Many of
these factors are driven or exacerbated by financial/
economic concerns. In addition, the nature and impact
of the current global economic and social revolution
will dictate where conflict is most likely to happen,
and where the U.S. military should be ready to deploy
and employ its tools of influence.
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CONFLICT AS A NECESSARY EVIL
At the same time, instability and friction, along
with growth and decline, are essential components of
a viable society. This is because it is only when existing practices are challenged that growth is possible.
Unfortunately, change is never universally welcomed,
nor is it necesssarily good, and a degree of conflict is
therefore inevitable. Therefore, the key is to ensure that
the resulting conflict does not escalate out of control.
To this end, it is imperative to be able to determine
what level of instability is beneficial and sustainable
for a society and to assess when that level becomes too
high or too low. In addition, when instability becomes
unmanageable, it is important to assess accurately
what action is necessary to bring the situation back
under control.
This can only be achieved by obtaining appropriate intelligence in order to assess correctly the precise
nature of the threats, instabilities, and opportunities
present in any given situation. Financial intelligence
plays a key part in not only assessing the level of instability, but also in suggesting ways to bring instability
back under control. This is where threat finance comes
into play.
WHAT IS THREAT FINANCE?
Threat finance is the means and methods used by
the adversary to ensure their economic survival. The
term “adversary” refers to individuals and organizations that pose a threat to national and international
security, including, but not limited to, a wide range of
actors such as terrorist organizations, narco- and hu-
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man traffickers, transnational organized crime groups,
and cyber criminals. Put simply, threat finance is how
bad guys make, hide, move, and spend their money.
Understanding threat finance means understanding
the various mechanisms and networks of third parties
that enable that to happen.
Adversaries engage in a wide variety of activities,
both legitimate and illegitimate, to secure their cash
flow and to maintain their assets. Activities to that aim
include kidnapping, extortion, arms dealing, drug
dealing, human trafficking, counterfeiting, cybercrime, and fraud. Legitimate activities include businesses and financial investment such as financial securities trading, as well as other types of investments
in commodities and real estate. Where the sources of
funding are illegitimate, money laundering occurs in
an effort to make the money appear legitimate to conceal its criminal origins. The instruments for money
laundering are extensive and include the abuse of
shell companies, mortgages, insurance products, precious stones, real estate, high value goods, charities,
and banks.12
Counter threat finance (CTF), on the other hand,
refers to activities intended to undermine those
threats. This is typically achieved through the use of
financial intelligence and a number of other available
measures such as asset seizures, economic sanctions,
and anti-money laundering regimes. The stakeholders of CTF are broad, ranging from governments, law
enforcement, and the military to the private sector, to
include banks, insurance companies, mortgage lenders, money service businesses (MSBs), law firms, accountancy firms, and real estate agents.
Financial intelligence is at the heart of CTF strategies, even though the terms “threat finance” and “financial intelligence” are often used interchangeably.
10

In addition, the definition of both terms can appear
ambiguous due to their dynamic nature. This should
not be seen as a negative, as it is the fluid nature of
these tools that will prove to serve well against the
equally ambiguous threat environment outlined at the
beginning of this monograph. As such, financial intelligence and the use of CTF strategies will be critical in
unravelling the complexity of the threats that reveal
themselves through financial networks.
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE
The use of financial intelligence in defense has
improved in recent years, but nevertheless remains
rudimentary compared to the analysis provided in
the private sector, such as by investment banks. Its
use in defense also displays a tendency to over focus
on individual strands or components of finance. Although “following the money” is a key part of developing financial intelligence, this alone is not enough.
It is only the starting point. What really matters is the
interpretation of the data so that the intelligence gathered can be used to help achieve a given objective. In
other words, the key is in the analysis of what that
financial raw intelligence actually means, and how it
can be used.
Thus the same principle applies to financial intelligence as to intelligence in general. A common mistake
is to consider “intelligence” as being synonymous
with “information.” However, information by itself is
not intelligence. Information plus analysis equals intelligence. So without analysis, there is no intelligence.
Misuse of the term has also led to the phrase “collecting intelligence” instead of “collecting information.”
Intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is pro-
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duced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed.
While this should to be a basic principle of established
intelligence disciplines, its application in the field of
financial intelligence is even more insufficient than in
other areas of intelligence assessments.
Furthermore, this analysis requires thoughtful
contemplation that results in conclusions and recommendations. Computers may assist with analysis by
compiling large amounts of data into an easily accessible format, but this is still only collated data; it is not
analyzed data or information, and, as such, falls far
short of being intelligence.
The same applies to financial intelligence in that
even when valuable financial data is collected, the
mere collation of such information is in itself not altogether helpful. The value is in the interpretation,
without which CTF strategies cannot be operationalized fully. The significance and its relevance to the
military is that the correct interpretation can be used
to reveal patterns of enemy behavior, motivations and
possible intentions as well as lifestyles and networks,
all of which will impact directly upon military operations within a COIN environment.
After all, money is in itself just paper or coins.
What makes money so important to people is its ability to transform into power, lifestyle, influence, food,
shelter, weapons, a wife (or more than one in some
cultures), family, realization of dreams, and more. In
other words, it is the corresponding economic value
as opposed its mere financial value that is at stake. As
such, money, or financial intelligence, must be understood within its broader economic context.
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SECURITY ECONOMICS
Threat finance is a component of security economics which is the analysis of the economic aspects of
human-induced insecurity, such as terrorism and organized crime. Many security threats are driven by
the desire for economic gain, either as an end in itself,
or to assist in achieving an ultimate end. In other cases, economic factors can be used to determine likely
future human actions. For example, the decision for
an individual to join either the Taliban or the Afghan
army is often based on economic factors as opposed
to ideology alone. There are undoubtedly individuals
with strong beliefs that will not be swayed by economic factors. However, for the majority, the ability
to survive economically will be the main factor.
This equally applies to the wide network of individuals in the financial network that enable threat
finance to take place, referring for example to individuals who work in the financial system who may
be willing to turn a blind eye to certain customers for
personal economic gain, especially if the risk is considered to be minimal. For example, a mortgage salesman
may be willing to turn a blind eye to certain risks in
order to meet his monthly sales target. Internal policy
and the existence of internal compliance officers are of
limited effectiveness in deterring such activity when
economic motivations override ethical considerations.
As such, the broader economic considerations must be
part of any CTF strategy.
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BRIEF HISTORY OF THREAT FINANCE
The concept of threat finance originated from terrorist finance. The events of 9/11 not only brought terrorism to the top of the political agenda for the United
States and its allies, but highlighted the importance of
tackling terrorist finance, which was acknowledged
as being the lifeblood of terrorism. It was recognized
that by disrupting the terrorist funding supply chain,
it was possible to mitigate and maybe even prevent
further terrorist attacks.13
However, as the interest in terrorist finance intensified, so too did the realization of its complexity. Furthermore, as the depth of understanding increased, it
became clear that the subject of terrorist finance could
not be looked at in isolation. It is this realization that
gave birth to the term “threat finance” which examines not only terrorist finance, but also other strands
of threat finances, referring to the finances of a wide
range of adversaries to include terrorist organizations,
narco- and human traffickers, transnational organized
crime groups, and cyber criminals.
CTF EFFORTS TO DATE
Following the 9/11 attacks, the first financial strike
by the United States in the so-called “global war on
terror” came in the form of Executive Order 13224,14
which targeted the financial assets of organizations
and individuals linked to terrorism, including al-Qaeda. Executive Order 13224 was followed by numerous
initiatives by the United States, the United Kingdom
(UK), and various international bodies creating many
new organizations with the goal of attacking terrorist
financial networks. These multilateral initiatives led
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to the designation of 315 entities and seizures amounting to $200 million (£106 million)15 in monetary and
other assets in over 1,400 accounts worldwide, as well
as the arrests of over 4,000 suspects,16 including many
senior al-Qaeda operatives, making the countering of
terrorist finance one of the most active dimensions in
the global war on terror.
The events of 9/11 also led to increased international cooperation. Over 100 countries have offered
increased intelligence support leading to intensified
counterterrorist operations by more than 200 intelligence and security services worldwide.17 In addition, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
(APEC) Summit in Shanghai, China, in October 2001,
APEC leaders issued a statement on counterterrorism
in which they strongly condemned the 9/11 attacks
and pledged to improve counterterrorism cooperation
through a number of means.
These means have included putting in place appropriate financial measures to prevent the flow of funds
to terrorists, including work on combating financial
crimes through the APEC Finance Ministers Working
Group on Fighting Financial Crime, as well as more
involvement in related international standard setting
regimes. These initiatives have led to agreements to
undertake early and constructive consultation prior
to designating terrorist assets, exchanging information on national legal criteria required to freeze terrorist funds, and updating global assessments of
frozen terrorists’ funds. However, the stakeholders
of CTF are not restricted to governments, militaries,
and the law enforcement community but extend to the
private sector.
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PRIVATE SECTOR
The aim of CTF in general is to create a financial
environment that is hostile to adversary organizations. With that in mind, governments and regulators
are continuing to introduce new laws and regulations
to keep up to pace with the ever mutating modus operandi of individuals involved in threat finance. The
requirement to comply covers not only financial institutions, but also other organizations such as estate
agents, legal firms, and accounting firms. Together,
the private sector can be described as being the first
line of defense for CTF strategy and operations. At the
heart of the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regimes
is the concept to “Know Your Customer” (KYC) and
the submission of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs),
both of which are rich sources of financial intelligence.
Know Your Customer.
The KYC requirement is essentially the due diligence procedures which should be carried out as part
of the initial client acceptance procedures. These include the verification of identity through the presentation of personal identification documentation such
as a passport, supported by utility bills to verify the
address of the potential customer. Other risk factors to
be taken into consideration include the geographical
location of the client (whether this is categorized as a
high-risk country), as well as whether the client is registered as a politically exposed person (PEP), a term
describing someone who has been entrusted with a
prominent public function, or an individual who is
closely related to such a person. Examples include
current or former senior officials in the executive, leg-
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islative, administrative, military, or judicial branch of
a foreign government (elected or not); a senior executive of a foreign government-owned commercial enterprise; being a corporation, business, or other entity
formed by or for the benefit of any such individual; an
immediate family member of such an individual; or
any individual known to be a close personal or professional associate.
PEPs generally present a higher risk for potential
involvement in bribery and corruption by virtue of
their position and the influence that they may hold. As
such, they are more closely monitored for the purpose
of CTF activities. The purpose of monitoring financial
transactions is so that any unexplained or potentially
suspicious activity can be reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of that country.
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs).
A SAR is a report submitted by organizations such
as financial institutions to include banks, mortgage
providers, and insurance companies, as well as real
estate agents, law firms, and accounting firms, to report suspicious or potentially suspicious financial activity to the FIU. Each jurisdiction has its own FIU. For
example, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN), which is a bureau of the U.S. Department
of the Treasury, is the FIU for the United States. Its
equivalent (in terms of its role as the country’s FIU) in
the UK is the National Crime Agency (NCA), which is
a law enforcement agency.
SARs include detailed information about financial
transactions that are, or appear to be suspicious. Reporting institutions are required to categorize these
transactions as either potential money laundering or
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terrorist financing activity. The FIU collates the SARs
received and makes the reports available to regional
law enforcement agencies based on the geographical
location of the account holder. It is a requirement in
the UK that all financial institutions have a system in
place to monitor financial transactions and to report
any suspicious activity to the FIU.18
The first stage of the risk-based financial monitoring process begins with financial profiling. Financial
profiling takes into consideration factors such as age,
profession, known income, and expenditure. Other
factors such as peer group analysis are used to set parameters indicating normal activity. Financial transactions are then monitored using the rules derived from
the financial profiles. Any transactions that fall outside these “normal” parameters flag up an alert which
is subsequently investigated by one of the bank’s
specialist financial investigators.
SARs can provide an essential pool of financial intelligence and place the private sector in the forefront
of the fight against terrorism and crime. SARs, also
known as disclosures, contribute intelligence to existing law enforcement operations, identify the proceeds
of crime, and initiate investigation into previously
unknown criminal activities. Unusual or suspicious
activities can also be identified not only through the
monitoring of transactions, but also through monitoring customer contacts, such as meetings, discussions,
and in-country visits, as well as third party information such as newspapers, the internet, and vendor
databases. Knowledge of the client’s environment
in terms of an understanding of the political situation in his home country may further contribute to
its analysis.
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SMART SANCTIONS
Existing CTF measures which target specific individuals and organizations responsible or associated with the funding of terrorism can be described
as falling under the category of ”smart sanctions.”19
The origin of smart/targeted sanctions predates the
events of 9/11. A brief background may be helpful in
understanding the concept which led to its development. Prior to the existence of smart sanctions, the use
of standard economic sanctions against enemy states,
including those which supported terrorism, was commonplace. However, traditional economic sanctions
have long been recognized as being ineffective. In addition, they possess a highly undesirable side effect
in the form of an indiscriminate impact on a country,
which can entail severe negative humanitarian consequences for the civilian population.20
This side effect is particularly of concern in the context of terrorism. International terrorism frequently
utilizes the suffering of innocent civilian populations
in two ways. First, the victimhood of those people
is emphasized, either to the victims themselves or
to those who empathize with those individuals. The
goal is to radicalize those individuals so that they can
either be recruited into the terrorist organizations or
provide other means of support.
Second, examples of unjust treatment are used to
attract funding, which in turn is used for the purpose
of financing terrorism. This is of particular importance,
because the origin of much of the donor funding is
derived through appealing to the charitable nature of
wealthy individuals who may or may not be aware of
the ultimate purpose of their financial donations.21
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WHAT COUNTER THREAT FINANCE
STRATEGIES CAN DO
The targeting of the financial, and perhaps more
importantly, the economic base of an organization,
will not only impact the operational capability of that
organization, but can ultimately lead to its destruction. To date, CTF strategies have been used predominantly for the purpose of disruption. However, the
potential application of CTF strategies goes far wider.
They have the potential to be a multifaceted weapon,
capable of tackling a number of issues relevant to the
military not only in terms of enemy disruption, but for
detecting impending instability.
For example, at a macro level, the movement of
money has the ability to provide early warning signals of impending activity. If people (especially key
individuals and organizations who possess the best
local knowledge) are moving their money and assets
to another country, this could signify expectancy of
future instability with potential security implications.
Furthermore, if financial/economic migration intensifies sharply, this could be catastrophic for the region
in itself, as the mass migration of money may cause
economic collapse, again leading to social unrest.
In such situations, it would be the role of the international community to intervene to provide financial assistance to stabilize the economic situation.
Although the military would not be involved in this
stage of the process, this is an unstable situation which
could easily escalate with numerous security implications of direct relevance to the military. As such, intelligence assessments of these warning signs should be
observed and tracked carefully by military planners.
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Similarly at a micro level, the movement of money
can signify impending action, or equally important,
inaction by adversary organizations allowing the military to plan its own operations accordingly. Here, the
proverb attributed to both Napoleon and Frederick the
Great that “an army marches on its stomach” (“C’est la
soupe qui fait le soldat”) translated as the “soup makes
the soldier,” stands true. The proverb suggests that a
group of soldiers or workers can only fight or function
effectively if they have been well fed.22 What is needed
to feed soldiers is, of course, money to buy the food. In
addition to the food of the proverb, soldiers or insurgents depend for effective fighting ability on shelter
or accommodation, logistic support for movement,
medical services to treat the injured, and supplies of
weapons and ammunition. In addition, money is also
needed to buy loyalty and increase morale, as well
as care for the relatives of the soldiers/insurgents in
the event that they do not survive a battle, and leave
family behind that require support.
Therefore, when payments are delayed or not
made, the entire logistical supply chain of the essentials of food and other vital supplies becomes disrupted, impacting heavily on the physical and psychological state of those fighters. This, in turn, will affect not
only their ability, but also their motivation and willingness to fight. As such, financial intelligence is able
to serve as a good indicator of the level of morale, as
well as the combat capability of the insurgents.
Although more work has been achieved in this
field at a local level (in country), there are additional
upstream factors that impact upon local circumstances, which also need to be taken into consideration. It
is also important to understand the various sources
of financial information that can be used to produce
financial intelligence for this purpose.
21

SOURCES OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Financial intelligence is the end product of analysis
of information gathered about the financial affairs of
individuals or entities of interest. It has the ability to
complement existing intelligence by providing additional supporting evidence, as well as to provide new
leads or to detect activities or networks which were
previously unknown.
Raw financial data can be obtained from a variety
of sources in the private and public sectors as well as
from individuals. Examples in the private sector include those financial institutions and service providers already listed, as well as MSBs such as Western
Union or Informal Value Transfer Services (IVTS).
It is worth noting that there is a wealth of data not
currently utilized which falls outside the previously
mentioned SARs. Many banks, for example, have the
mechanisms in place to enable them to monitor and
detect not only the financial transactions themselves,
but also where the money is coming from, where it
is going, changes of address, contact numbers, and
so forth.
However, it should also be noted that the private
sector is not an unlimited resource. Such organizations are bound by laws and regulations as well as
internal policies, and client data is protected by data
protection and human rights legislation. However, if
the questions are framed correctly and the organizations are approached in the right way, it is possible to
access this data which can be extremely valuable.
Although the monitoring and reporting requirements mentioned earlier relate to the regulated sector,
this does not mean that the unregulated sector also
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does not hold valuable financial intelligence. IVTS
such as Hawala23 retain transactional data which can
be highly relevant.24 The challenge is that due to the
lack of standardization,25 some of the information
made be difficult to interpret without the help of the
Hawaladar.26 Furthermore, as there is no regulatory requirement for holding onto data, historic transactions
may be discarded, once the business has concluded
(i.e., the financial transaction has been made), and it
is entirely at the Hawaladar’s discretion how long he
wishes to maintain records.27
Financial information can also be provided by
various private sector organizations where the core
business is not financial. Examples include retail outlets such as supermarket chains that provide loyalty
cards. Such information is particularly useful in that
the stores often offer a variety of services to include
insurance, communications (mobile phones, landline
phones and internet), as well as financing, all of which
is a rich source of financial information. In addition,
the stores’ delivery services for many items such as
food, furniture, and electrical goods, provide valuable
data in terms of addresses connected to the account
holder. Airline companies, utility providers such as
electricity or gas, mobile telephone and broadband
providers, and mail delivery companies also provide
valuable financial information as well as additional information such as telephone numbers and addresses.
M-transfers, also referred to as mobile money, mobile money transfer, and mobile wallet, generally refer
to payment services made via a mobile device such as
a mobile phone. Instead of paying with cash, check,
or credit cards, a consumer can use a mobile phone to
pay for a wide range of services, as well as for digital
or hard goods. Such services have become increas-
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ingly popular and widespread, especially in developing countries, where the formal banking system may
be limited or nonexistent. This forms a relatively new
method of moving money or paying for goods, in that
the technology that is needed, namely a mobile device
and connection to the internet, have only been in existence since the late-1990s.28
In addition to M-transfers, on-line auction houses
such as EBay and Amazon can also provide valuable
sources of financial information.29 Although their purpose and use is predominantly legitimate, as with the
Hawala system, there is on-going concern as to possible
use for criminality due to inadequate regulations and
loopholes in the law, which has diluted the requirement to report suspicious transactions. Also, even
where regulations exist, since they were developed
with bank transactions in mind they do little to cater
to M-transactions which are typically small value high
volume transactions.
In addition, there are challenges in terms of how
long records of transactions are required to be kept.
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that this is potentially a good source of financial information which
could be utilized. Furthermore, it is likely that as with
any emerging technology or service, regulations will
be enhanced once the dangers of not doing so are
further recognized.
Financial intelligence can also be obtained from
public sector sources such as government departments dealing with tax and social benefits. It is also
important to understand the ways in which illegitimate money flows are moved. For this, an appreciation of money laundering and of the various vehicles
used to launder money are necessary.
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Money Laundering.
Much of existing counter threat finance strategies
relies upon existing anti-money laundering (AML)
regimes enforced by legislation and regulation. However, there are two main challenges to this approach.
The first is that the AML regimes were initially introduced in the 1990s in response to the laundering of
the proceeds of narcotics trafficking related money.30
Although the AML regimes have been modified to
include other aspects of threat finance, such as terrorist finance, critics argue that this has simply been
an “add-on” which fails to tackle the issue of terrorist financing appropriately.31 The existing approach
is better described as being “one size fits all” as opposed to a tailored approach to tackle finances relating to terrorism. Nevertheless, the main benefit of the
AML regimes is that financial information is captured,
which can then be interrogated by the investigating
authorities.32
A further challenge is that money laundering is understood by many simply as a process whereby “bad”
money turns into “good” money.33 Unfortunately,
money does not only come in two simple shades of
black and white. White money, also known as clean
money, refers to “ordinary” money that is obtained in
small denominations through hard work and related
bonuses, prudent investment, or inheritance.34 The
opposite of clean money is dirty or “black” money,
which is obtained through criminal means. But there
is also “grey” money, money that the owner wishes
to disassociate him or herself from, even though its
origins may not have been illegal.
One example is where an individual may not wish
his spouse, partner, or relatives to be aware of his
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wealth for a variety of reasons, such as impending divorce. Another example is where a profitable business
may wish to maintain a low profile to avoid attracting attention which may result in increased competition.35 In addition, there is “hot” money, referring to
financial movements stimulated by adverse changes
in economic, social, and/or political conditions. A further consideration is that the best place to hide black
money is with white or grey money, and the movements are often made unnecessarily complex in an attempt by the criminal to put off the investigator as a
result of the lack of transparency, as well as the time
needed to unravel the financial audit trail.
HOW EFFECTIVE HAS CTF BEEN TO DATE?
The importance of tackling the finances of adversary organizations has long been recognized. However, despite the existence of relevant legislation and
regulation, the current environment continues to favor
the adversary. For example, some economists have
calculated that less than 1 percent of terrorist finances
have been captured to date.36 There are many reasons
for this, but one is because of limited understanding as
to what threat finance is in terms of first, how to detect
it, and second, knowing what to do about it. Although
the understanding of each of the individual components of threat finance has undeniably increased in recent years, counter threat finance strategies have not
been particularly effective in real terms.
One reason is in relation to the way in which CTF
strategies are understood and applied. The understanding of the subject is often limited and over-simplistic and, as such, has not been fit for the purpose.
In addition, finance is often treated as a stand-alone
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subject. Instead, it should be treated not only as valuable intelligence in its own right, but also a tool that
enables different types of intelligence to be brought
together, and to validate or discard existing intelligence as appropriate. This is particularly relevant in
an era where intelligence fusion is continuing to be
recognized as key to the future of defense intelligence.
Lessons Not Learned.
Financial disruption strategies to date, typically
characterized by their disjointed nature, have not
been particularly effective. For example, in Afghanistan, in some cases efforts to disrupt Taliban finances
are likely to have done more harm than good in terms
of the overall COIN effort. A case in point is the pursuit of Hawaladars, an easy target, where the broader
economic consequences of such actions are frequently
overlooked. The disruption of a single Hawaladar,
especially if the action is not justified, will do more
to promote insurgency than to prevent it. In general,
there is an overemphasis on disruption, where the
goals are so focused that they frequently fail to acknowledge the damage that action might be causing
in the wider context, which in turn exacerbates the
underlying problem.
CONCLUSIONS
CTF strategies have the potential to become “hyper-strategic” weapons due to the fact that “financial
war” is easily manipulated and allows for concealed
actions, as well as having the capacity to be highly destructive. Furthermore, financial warfare is likely to be
an increasing form of conflict due to its position which
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lies at the intersection of powerful long-term trends in
technology, networks, information, and finance. The
precise targeting feature of financial warfare, relative
to conventional economic warfare, marks a significant
change in the nature of conflict.
In addition, the use of finance should be recognized
as a tool for influence. Financial intelligence holds
special utility in that it is easily controlled to actionable outcomes designed to influence target behavior,
the target being any individual or organization in the
financial logistical supply chain. Influence is reliant on
the successful manipulation of incentives and disincentives. This involves shaping the spectrum of options that are available to groups through tailored and
focused activities aimed at specific pressure points.
However, in order to achieve this, there must be
the willingness to embrace more complex financial
analysis to include “high” finance. To date, there has
been a tendency to overfocus on targeting the vast
volume of low hanging fruit; the “smart” targeting
of “low volume, high return” targets must also be encouraged. Given the constraints in available resources, every effort must be made to pursue actions that
optimize return on investment. In order to further the
U.S. Army’s development and capability in effectively
operationalizing CTF strategies in future years, the
following recommendations should be considered.
FUTURE COUNTER THREAT FINANCE
STRATEGIES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
U.S. ARMY
1. Integration—Counter finance strategies should
be fully integrated as part of a comprehensive COIN/
CT/stabilization strategy, to ensure that short-, me-
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dium-, and long-term financial targeting strategies are
adopted to address both upstream and downstream
finances to maximum effect.
2. Embrace Complexity—The willingness to embrace more complex high finance methods must be developed. In order to address the tendency to overfocus
on targeting the vast volume of low hanging fruit, the
smart targeting of “low volume, high return” targets
must be encouraged.
3. Influence—The use of finance as a tool for influence should be further explored through developing
knowledge of the broader financial network in order
to be able to identify suitable pressure points.
4. Knowledge and Intelligence Gaps—These gaps
should be addressed through education, the use of
suitably qualified expertise, and by carrying out a selfassessment to ensure that the right questions are being
framed, and that the right people are being engaged to
obtain the necessary answers.
5. Global Financial Audit Trail—A deeper understanding of the broader global financial networks and
investment strategies will help identify key vulnerabilities in the networks.
6. Financial Intelligence—Finances, including
economic assets, should be viewed not only as a target subject to disruption, but also as a lucrative intelligence source. The existing tendency to focus on individual strands or components of finance should be
avoided and replaced with a conscious effort to adopt
a networked approach to the collection and analysis of
financial data. Collation of financial data by following
the money should be supported by better analysis to
enable better use of that data. In other words, better
interpretation of financial data focusing on possible
application is needed. Appropriate financial analysis/
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intelligence will reveal patterns of enemy behavior,
motivations, possible intensions, lifestyles, networks,
as well as morale and readiness to fight.
7. Kinetic vs. Influence—Caution should be exercised against the overuse of kinetic targeting. The
impact of such action must first be properly assessed
not only in terms of the enemy, but the wider network
which will consist of both those who are part of the adversary network, as well as civilians who should not
be regarded as collateral damage—either in a physical
or a financial/economic sense. Instead, consideration
should be given to the possibility of replacing kinetic
action with influence strategies whenever possible.
8. Hawala System—Targeting the Hawala system,
as well as associated Hawaladars, must be carried out
with caution, taking local economic factors into consideration. Cultural considerations must form part of
any finance targeting to enable effective disruption
operations to take place while mitigating side effects.
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